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OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS
EXPERIENCED BY SINGLE PILOTS
IN INSTRUMENT METEROLOGICAL CONDITIONS
by
Stacy Weislogel
INTRODUCTION
The Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) provides a unique resource
for identifying operational problems experienced by different classes of
pilots operating in various environments. This report presents the results
of a study of the operational problems experienced by general aviation pilots
flying alone on instrument flight rules (IFR) in instrument meteorological
conditions (IMC).
General aviation's generation of IFR flight operations is impressive.
Instrument operations at airports with FAA Traffic Control Service included
10.6 million air carrier and 19.6 million general aviation operations in
1980. By 1992 the FAA forecasts 12.8 million air carrier (21 percent
increase) and 30.5 million general aviation (56 percent.increase) instrument
operations. The number of instrument rated pilots is expected to increase 48
percent during the same period.(1)
Presently, many IFR single pilot (SPIFR) operations are conducted by
highly trained and experienced pilots flying modern, well equipped airplanes.
However, a large proportion of the general aviation IFR operations involve
relatively inexperienced single pilots, often with limited equipment, who are
expected by the ATC system to perform at the same level of competency as the
*The author is a Professor of Aviation at The Ohio State University and
serves as a consultant to the ASRS program.
professional air carrier crews. Aviation agencies and user organizations
have expressed concern that the level of competency expected to be demanded
of the future SPIFR will not be attained unless significant improvements in
the design of the aviation system are achieved. As a result, NASA is con-
ducting a research effort independent of this study to provide the background
research and to develop the technology required to improve the safety and
utility of the single pilot general aviation aircraft operating under instru-
ment flight rules.
This report illustrates how the ASRS database can be used to contribute
to a current aviation research effort being conducted by NASA.
OBJECTIVE
•
The objective of this study was to identify and' analytically describe
the operational problems reported to the ASRS by the general aviation airman
operating as a single pilot in instrument meteorological conditions. A
further interest was to understand the nature and type of operational prob-
lems being experienced by this class of airman, referred to as single pilot
IFR, or SPIFR.
SCOPE
This study is based on a review of reports in the ASRS-2 database as of
December 10, 1980, for small aircraft, and as of March 18, 1981, for small
transport aircraft. For any particular occurrence to be pertinent to this
study, it must have met the following requirements. The aircraft must be (1)
the type usually flown by a single pilot, (2) operating on an IFR flight plan
in instrument meteorological conditions, and (3) experiencing an operational
problem.
An operational problem is defined as any occurrence included in the
ASRS-2 database in which the safe and/or efficient conduct of a SPIFR flight
was adversely affected. With two exceptions , the occurrences consist of a
pilot's report about his own performance, reports by a pilot about the system
performance, or reports by an air traffic controller about a pilot's perfor-
mance.
Although the operational problems identified in this study were reported
to be experienced by the SPIFR, they may not be peculiar to this class of
airman. Multiple-pilot crews may experience the same operational problems to
a greater or lesser extent.
APPROACH
The approach to the study encompassed the following steps: (1) develop
and implement a search strategy to extract pertinent reports from the ASRS-2
database, create a document set for analysis, (2) develop a meaningful clas-
sification framework in which to fit the reports, and (3) document and
analyze the reports.
Two SPIFR document sets were created: one concerning small (SMA) air-
craft, the other concerning small transport (SMT) aircraft. In the ASRS, SMA
are defined as less than 5,000 pounds maximum allowable gross weight, and SMT
aircraft as 5,000 to 14,000 pounds. Although the nature of the reports does
not always permit a determination of single versus multiple pilot crews, SMA
are most often flown by a single pilot. By applying carefully selected cri-
teria to filter out SMT reports likely to involve multiple pilot crews, a SMT
single pilot document set was was created. In addition, by limiting the
search to IFR flight plan trips that encountered instrument meteorological
conditions, operational problems experienced by IFR single pilots were more
readily identified. Further, numerous reports of traffic conflicts occurring
in the see-and-avoid environment were eliminated.
An analysis of the narrative information in each of the reports led to
the development of a classification framework of operational problem
kOne by the USAF, the other by a passenger/pilot.
categories into which each report was fitted. This procedure also eliminated
those reports found not to be a SPIFR operational problem.
A first step in the documentation and analysis of the reports in each
operational problem category was the preparation of a data table summarizing
the relevant descriptive characteristics of each occurrence. Included in
each of these data tables is information used in the assessment of the
safety, efficiency, and workload characteristics of SPIFR operation. This
information is presented later in this report. The analyses of the descrip-
tive characteristics of each operational problem category and its safety,
efficiency, and workload characteristics were conducted simultaneously, but
are shown separately for the purposes of effective results' presentation.
For example, Table 11 indicates the type of altitude deviation for each
occurrence. Information on Evasive Action, Conflict Alert (CA), Potential
Conflict (PC), and Less than Standard Separation (LTSS) is presented and used
later in an assessment of the impact on safety of altitude deviations by the
SPIFR. Mission Phase data is used in a later assessment of SPIFR workload,
and has been recoded using terminology more appropriate to workload assess-
ment. The Number of Aircraft Involved determines what efficiency impact
measure will be applied.
During the analysis of each occurrence by operational problem category,
an attempt was made to determine why the problem occurred as a first step in
solving the problem.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Table 1 summarizes the search strategies which resulted in the SPIFR
document set. The SMA document set was formed by applying a search strategy
which simultaneously satisfied the following criteria applied to the ASRS-2
fixed field data: (1) Type of Aircraft: SMA, (2) Leg Flight Plan: IFR, (3)
Flight Conditions: IMC. This strategy produced 310 reports, 91 involving
only one SMA, and 219 more than one aircraft, at least one of which was SMA.
All statistical tables are presented in Appendix A.
An analysis of the 91 reports revealed that 29 should be deleted, leaving 62
reports suitable for analysis. Of the 29 deleted, 20 concerned controller
coordination in which the pilot was not a factor, and 9 were not IFR opera-
tional problems. Analysis of the narrative information in each of the 62
reports resulted in nine operational problem categories. A separate analysis
was made of the 219 reports involving more than one aircraft, at least one of
which was SMA. In 31 of the 219 reports, the SMA was involved in one of the
nine operational problem categories. Two reports were added because they
were referenced by one or more of the 31 reports, for a total of 33 reports.
The final SMA document set consists of 95 reports representing 88
occurrences. An occurrence is an independent event which can be reported by
more than one observer.
The SMT document set was formed by applying a search strategy which
simultaneously satisfied the following criteria applied to the ASRS-2 fixed
field data: (1) Type of Aircraft: SMT, (2) Leg Flight Plan: IFR, (3)
Flight Conditions: IMC, (4) Airframe Characteristics (Engine): ER or ET
(Reciprocating or Turboprop). EJ (Turbojet) aircraft were filtered out using
the last criterion, because of the multiple-pilot crew requirement. This
strategy produced 302 reports, 101 involving only one SMT, and 201 involving
more than one aircraft, at least one of which was SMT. To insure a high
likelihood that the the SMT document set would contain single pilot reports,
additional criteria were applied to the ASRS-2 fixed field data to filter out
those reports probably involving multiple-pilot crews. The additional docu-
ment criteria were: (5) Operator Class: Civil (CIV), and (6) Operator
Organization: Air Taxi (ATX), Fixed Base Operator (FBO), Renter (RNT), Cor-
porate (CPR), and Personal (PER). Criteria (5) and (6) were applied during
an analysis of the narrative information in the 302 reports which also
deleted reports not considered an IFR operational problem. The analysis
resulted in the deletion of 265 reports and the addition of one operational
problem category. Four reports were added because they were referenced by
one or more of the reports to be included in the SMT document set. The final
SMT document set consists of 41 reports representing 36 occurrences. The
SPIFR document set combines the SMA and SMT document sets and consists of 136
reports representing 124 occurrences.
An analysis of each report narrative led to a characterization of the
occurrence in terms of how the safe and/or efficient conduct of the SPIFR
flight was affected adversely. On the basis of researcher judgement, ten
categories of operational problems experienced by single pilots in instrument
meteorological conditions were identified. Each of the categories is exam-
ined in detail in the Operational Problems section.
Although ASRS data cannot accurately establish the prevalence of a prob-
lem, they can often provide convincing evidence that a problem exists. ASRS
was designed to provide insights into problems present in the National Avia-
tion System and why such problems exist, thereby pointing to possible solu-
tions for such problems. Thus, ASRS is primarily an analytical, rather than
a descriptive, tool.(2)
Tables 2 through 8 present a statistical profile of the SPIFR, SMA, and
SMT document sets. Where the occurrence concerns more than one aircraft, the
data describe the key pilot and aircraft variables involved. Where the
occurrence is described by more than one report, the data are from the
pilot's report and the report indicating more than one aircraft involved, as
applicable.
Table 2 summarizes the number of reports and occurrences in the SMA and
SMT document sets by Operational Problem Category and number of aircraft
involved. The ordering of the Operational Problems is essentially the same
for both sets. Seven of the ten operational problems are common to both. In
the SMA set, the CIV operator class accounted for 86 of the 88 occurrences.
In the SMT set, all of the 36 occurrences concerned the CIV operator class.
As illustrated in Table 3, the number of occurrences is about equally
divided between pilot and controller reports, which is also true of the total
ASRS-2 database. Passenger (PAX), Freight (FRT) and Charter (CHR) operations
are typically flown by professional pilots. Of the occurrences in which the
Operation is identified, 9 percent of the SMA set and 50 percent of the SMT
set are in these three categories consistent with the tendency for SMT air-
craft to be flown by professional pilots. The Training (TRN) operation in
which both a pilot and an instrument flight instructor are aboard the air-
plane was not removed from the study because the instructor usually permits
the pilot to make mistakes typical of a SPIFR operation.
Taken together, Tables 2 and 3 suggest that professional and nonprofes-
sional pilots are experiencing generally the same types of problems in SPIFR
flight.
That the SMT is typically flown by a professional pilot is again illus-
trated by Table 4, in which the largest number of identified Operator
Organization/Operation (Mission) type pairs in the SMA set are PER/Pleasure
(PLS) and PER/Personal Business (PRB) compared to the pairs ATX/Passenger
(PAX), PER/PRB, and CPR/PAX in the SMT set.
The effect of workload on SPIFR operational problems appears in Table 5.
Eighteen percent of SMA and 31 percent of SMT occurrences are in the Initial
Climb (ICB) and Climb (CLB) Phases of Flight, which include the high workload
departure phase. The highest proportion of general aviation IFR accidents
occurs in the high workload approach phase. Thirty-six percent of SMA and 31
percent of SMT occurrences are in the Approach (APR) and Missed Approach
(MAP) Phases of Flight. Although 27 percent SMA and 19 percent SMT
occurrences are in the Cruise (CRS) Phase of Flight, the CRS Phase is not
considered high workload. However, a large percentage of the flight time is
in CRS with more time for an operational problem to develop.
Information on pilot total flight time and recency of experience is
presented in Tables 6 and 7. Taken together, the data in these tables sug-
gest that the pilot reporters are experienced pilots, lending additional
credibility to the reports which they have contributed to the ASRS. Although
the SMT reports are few in number, the SMT pilot reporter has more flight
time and a higher level of recency of experience than the SMA pilot. Over
half the SMA pilots who reported their flight time have 2000 hours or more
total time, and 50 hours or more in the last 90 days. Similarly, half of the
SMT pilots have 4000 hours or more total time, and over half have 150 hours
or more in the last 90 days.
A Chi-square statistical test of significance of the SMA and SMT parts
of Tables 2 and 4 was performed by the ASRS staff. It was concluded that
there is no significant difference in the types of operational problems
experienced by SMA pilots versus SMT pilots. However, there is a very signi-
ficant difference in the operation (mission) type performed by SMA versus SMT
pilots. A similar test of Table 6, total flight time, was judged to be not
meaningful because of the small number of SMT total flight time reports.
These findings further support the suggestion that the more experienced pilot
is experiencing the same type of SPIFR operational problems as is the less
experienced pilot. The significance of this hypothesis, if confirmed, would
be that the operational problems experienced by the SPIFR are independent of
experience. Effective remedies, therefore, do not lie in improving SPIFR
capabilities through more training and experience, but rather in changing the
nature of the SPIFR task by redesigning cockpit systems and ATC procedures.
An independent study of the general aviation SPIFR operational profile, now
in progress, will provide a source of information to test this hypothesis
more completely.(3)
Table 8 presents information on the airframe characteristics of the air-
craft contained in the SPIFR document set. Low wing airplanes appear in the
set more than twice as often as high wing airplanes. The difference between
the SMT and SMA document sets in the other characteristics is expected, with
the SMT having a greater proportion of retractable landing gear (92 percent
vs 57 percent), turboprop engines (25 percent vs 0 percent), and two engines
(100 percent vs 16 percent). This table again illustrates that the SMT is
more likely to be flown by a professional pilot.
In summary, the statistical profile of the SPIFR document set presented
by Tables 2 through 8 suggests that: (1) the operational problem categories
appear to be reasonable, (2) the SMT aircraft are more likely to be flown by
experienced professional pilots, (3) the operational problems tend to occur
in the high workload phases of flight, and (4) both SMA and SMT pilots are
experiencing the same types of operational problems in approximately the same
ranking, suggesting that SPIFR operational problems are independent of
experience.
Operational Problems
The foregoing general findings suggest that the potential for developing
insights into the operational problems experienced by single pilots in
instrument meteorological conditions is possible through an analysis of the
document sets by operational problem category.
Pilot allegations of inadequate service. - Pilots and air traffic con-
trollers hold certain expectations about each other's performance and how the
various components of the ATC system operate. When a pilot's handling by an
air traffic controller is not what he had expected, he is likely to consider
the ATC service inadequate. Similarly, the pilot is likely to consider the
ATC system inadequate if a certain service component does not perform to his
expectations.
The reports showed that pilots' expectations about the performance of
controllers and the system are not being satisfied. Pilot allegations of
inadequate service comprise the largest category of SPIFR operational prob-
lems identified in ASRS-2. Of the 124 occurrences in the document set, 37
(30 percent) concern inadequate service. These 37 occurrences are distri-
buted among four subcategories, as shown in Table 9. Table 10 summarizes the
pilot expectation which was not satisfied in the 37 occurrences.
Pilot expectation is a complex matter related to each individual's accu-
mulation of aeronautical experience, knowledge, and skill. Whether a certain
expectation is reasonable, valid, or justified must be measured against the
system standard of performance, if indeed one exists that can be applied to a
specific occurrence. Table 10 lists researcher judgements regarding the rea-
sonableness of each expectation. Overall, the pilot's expectations were
thought reasonable three times out of four. Although in many cases, the
pilot may appear merely to be expressing annoyance that his expectations were
not satisfied, the safety implications of each can be inferred. Instances
where pilot's expectations were judged not reasonable suggest topics for air-
men refresher courses and other continuing education programs for pilots.
Overall, 23 of the 37 inadequate service occurrences (62 percent) con-
cerned pilot allegations of inadequate service from ATC, with about the same
proportion of occurrences reported in both SMA and the SMT document sets.
Allegations of inadequate service because of problems with radio communica-
tions reception (5, 14 percent), aviation weather reporting (5, 14 percent),
and NAVAIDS (4, 11 percent), make up the balance of the 37 occurrences.
Altitude deviation. - Altitude deviation occurrences are the second
most common category of SPIFR operational problems identified in ASRS-2,
accounting for 20 percent of the document set. Reports of altitude devia-
tions have been submitted by pilots and controllers, although predominantly
by the latter (20 of 25 occurrences, or 80 percent). The operational charac-
teristics of these occurrences are summarized in Table 11.
The following definitions, contained in the ASRS Third Quarterly
Report(4), have been applied to the SPIFR altitude deviation occurrences:
• An altitude overshoot (AO) is an occurrence in which an
aircraft either climbs above, or descends below, an alti-
tude to which it has been cleared.
• An altitude undershoot (AU) exists when an aircraft ter-
minates a climb at an altitude below that to which it has
been cleared, or terminates a descent at an altitude
above that to which it has been cleared.
• An altitude excursion (AE) is a deviation (of greater
than 300 feet) above or below an altitude at which an
aircraft has been cleared and which it was maintaining
prior to the excursion. (Note: the part of the defini-
tion in parentheses was not applied in this study.)
• An altitude deviation (AD) is a generic term incorporat-
ing all of the above, and the following two definitions
added for purposes of this study.
• An altitude maintained (AM) exists when an aircraft fails
to leave its presently assigned altitude for a newly
assigned altitude.
• A premature altitude change (AC) occurs when an aircraft
initiates a premature climb or descent from its presently
assigned altitude.
Concerning altitude deviations, the problem of misunderstood clearances
is particularly disturbing, given the "readback" redundancy purposely
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designed into the system to compensate for possible misunderstandings. Dur-
ing the analysis of altitude deviation occurrences, the phenomenon of "mind
set" emerged, wherein the pilot apparently selected an altitude from a
preconditioning or subsequent intervening event, other than that which was
assigned. Examples of the mind set phenomenon include pilots climbing to a
flight planned or requested altitude, and seeking an altitude assigned to
another aircraft.
When it appeared through a close reading of a narrative that a contri-
buting factor, including mind set, could explain why an altitude deviation
occurred, it was classified in Table 11 using the following abbreviations.
The mind set phenomenon was identified in 68 percent of the altitude devia-
tion occurrences.
MSF: mind set, flignt planned - pilot seeks altitude
which he filed in flight plan rather than assigned alti-
tude .
MSA: mind set, assigned to another aircraft - pilot
seeks altitude which he likely overheard assigned to
another aircraft.
MSR: mind set, requested - pilot seeks requested rather
than assigned altitude.
MSH: mind set, habit - pilot seeks altitude by habit
rather than assigned altitude.
UNK: reason for altitude deviation unknown.
Of the 25 SPIFR aircraft involved in altitude deviation occurrences, 15
involved SMA aircraft and 10 SMT aircraft. Altitude overshoots accounted for
the greatest number of deviations, 17 (68 percent); followed by premature
altitude changes, 3 (12 percent); altitude undershoots, 2 (8 percent); alti-
tude maintained, 2 (8 percent); and altitude excursions, 1 (4 percent).
These results are comparable to the earlier ASRS study of altitude devia-
tions.(4) An evasive action, conflict alert, potential conflict, or less than
standard separation was reported in 19 (76 percent) of the AD occurrences.
Nineteen (76 percent) involved the relatively high workload phases
Departure (DEP), Holding (HLD), Arrival (ARR), Approach (APR), and Missed
Approach (MAP).
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Personal business and pleasure flights accounted for more than half (69
percent) of the operations identified.
Controllers reported 80 percent of the ADs. In each case, the con-
troller alleged that the pilot had erred. Since ASRS reports are not veri-
fied, it is possible that in some cases the controller erred, and the pilot
was merely complying with an incorrect altitude assignment.
Human error is clearly evident in the ADs. Over half (13) involve pilot
perception as the enabling factor, and 10 involve pilot technique. A factor
in an occurrence is classified as "enabling" if its absence would probably
have precluded the occurrence.
That the mind set phenomenon is the dominant predisposing condition for
the human errors leading to ADs shows clearly in the Table 11 data with
almost half of the ADs, 12 (48 percent) classified in the MSA category; 2 (8
percent) in the MSF category; 2 (8 percent) in the MSR category; and one
coded MSH. The phenomenon is illustrated in these narratives:
"Pilot of small aircraft was assigned 3000 feet after
departure from Ft. Lauderdale Executive Airport. Pilot
was observed climbing through 4600 feet at which time I
questioned his assigned altitude. Pilot had filed for
8000 and was climbing to that altitude. No other traffic
involved." (077)*
"Aircraft A that departed Chattanooga Aiport was given
vectors to on course and was told to maintain 5000 feet.
Aircraft A requested 7000 feet due to other aircraft
going in the same direction. Later on Aircraft A was
given instructions to climb to 6000 and he advised that
he was at 7000 feet." (099)
The data do not support the belief that many altitude deviations occur
in the high density terminal areas, inasmuch as only 4 (16 percent) of the
occurrences were in ATA or TRS airspace. However, liberal coding of OCA air-
space for mission phases typical of terminal areas may explain this result.
Numbers at the ends of quotations are sequence numbers of items in the study
data set.
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In summary, ADs account for a significant portion of SPIFR operational
problems with overshoots being reported several times more often than the
other types. Human error and workload appear to be the main factors leading
to ADs. Increased emphasis on the importance of the following pilot actions:
altitude readback and verification of altitude when in doubt, seem to have
the greatest potential for reducing the incidence of ADs. In a period when
the use of altitude encoding transponders is increasing, it is surprising
that ADs rank so high on the list of SPIFR operational problems. A pilot
leaving an assigned altitude is required to report to ATC. If altitude devi-
ations are judged to be a severe safety problem, the benefit of mandatory
reporting of arrival at a newly assigned altitude, thereby placing that alti-
tude at a higher level in the pilot's consciousness, could be weighed against
the costs of increased frequency congestion.
Improperly flown approach. - Improperly flown approach occurrences are
the third most common category of SPIFR operational problems identified in
the study data set, accounting for 15 percent of the combined SMA and SMT
document sets. Reports of improperly flown approaches have been submitted by
pilots and controllers, although more often by the latter (12 of 18
occurrences, or 67 percent). The characteristics of improperly flown
approach occurrences are summarized in Table 12.
The instrument approach phase of a SPIFR flight generally subjects the
pilot to his greatest workload and often tests his instrument flying skill to
the limit. Accident data continue to demonstrate the high percentage of avi-
ation accidents which occur in the landing phase, including the instrument
approach. A study of NTSB accident files for the period 1964 through 1975
revealed 877 single-pilot pilot error accidents, 446 (51 percent) of which
occurred during the landing phase; 335 of the 446 had filed an IFR flight
plan. Detailed examination of the 335 reports revealed that 96 (29 percent)
happened during an ILS approach, 90 (27 percent) during a VOR approach, 30 (9
percent) during a LOG approach, and 21 (6 percent) during an NDB approach.(5)
Of the 18 improperly flown approach occurrences described in this
study's data set, 9 (50 percent) occurred during an ILS approach, 4 (22 per-
cent) during a VOR approach, 2 (11 percent) during a LOG BC approach, and 2
13
(11 percent) during an NDB approach. Radar assistance was available in 67
percent of the occurrences, and it is likely that it was also available in an
additional 16 percent. An evasive action, conflict alert, potential con-
flict, or less than standard separation was reported in 7 (39 percent) of the
occurrences. Three of the five pilots who reported flight time had a rela-
tively high amount. The role of ATC in assisting pilots having difficulty in
flying an instrument approach is clear, with ATC being credited as the
recovery factor in all but one of the nine occurrences in which the factor
was identified.
The operational problem experienced by the pilot in each of the six
occurrences reported by pilots is summarized below. Lack of IFR single pilot
proficiency may be inferred in each of the occurrences.
Cleared for an ILS approach, pilot reports following GS
but never intercepting LOG, and overflying airport. (004)
After an IFR proficiency flight, pilot reports that his
CFII executed a missed VOR approach incorrectly. (010)
Pilot reports having incorrectly tracked his LOG on a BC
approach due to fatigue, resulting in a missed approach.
(035)
Pilot reports experiencing vertigo during night ILS
approach, resulting in missed approach. (109)
After being radar vectored to the VOR/DME final approach
course, pilot reports incorrectly turning outbound in
order to fly a procedure turn. (053)
After missing first attempt at an NDB approach, pilot
reports landing out of an approach when not in a normal
position to do so. (119)
Twelve improperly flown instrument approaches were reported by air
traffic controllers. Each revealed a severe lack of IFR single pilot profi-
ciency. The performance of the pilot, as reported by the controller in each
occurrence, is summarized as follows:
SMA was vectored for a VOR approach five times. Nonradar
approach was then issued. (003)
SMA did not report a missed ILS approach in a timely
manner, and did not comply with published missed approach
procedure. Disruption resulted in coordinating three
other aircraft operations. (022)
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SMT tuned in wrong NDB in order to fly an NDB approach.
(101)
Inbound on an ILS approach, SMA made a 180 degree turn at
the OM. (043)
Radar vectored for third attempt at an ILS approach; upon
intercepting final approach course, SMA reversed course
and flew outbound. (051)
After being cleared for a nonradar ILS approach, it was
determined that the SMA pilot did not know his position
and had descended below the minimum IFR altitude. (056)
SMA did not report a missed ILS approach in a timely
manner and overflew the airport. (060)
SMT did not perform contact approach properly and missed
the airport. (113)
SMA made two 360 turns on the final approach course of an
ILS approach during simultaneous parallel ILS approach
operations. (070)
SMT lands out of an ILS approach on the wrong parallel
runway over a wide body transport holding in position for
takeoff. (116)
SMA missed two LOC(BC) approaches and one ILS approach.
Radar vectors were then given to the airport. (083)
Cleared for a VOR approach, SMA incorrectly initiates a
180 degree course reversal to perform a procedure turn.
(086)
The pilot's lack of awareness of his position during an instrument
approach was a factor in at least three of the improperly flown approach
occurrences (003, 056, 113), as illustrated by the following narrative:
"...Vectors were issued to VOR A approach circle to land
Rwy 32. During the next 25 minutes the aircraft was
within 12 miles of the airport but did not land until
1210 EDT. Five different times Aircraft A was vectored
to intercept the Deer Park 066 degree radial for the
approach and all five times he couldn't find it. Finally
radar service was terminated and he was issued a nonradar
clearance for the VOR approach. This all took 15 minutes
and was within 6 miles of VOR. After Aircraft A reported
Deer Park on the approach it took him another 10 minutes
to go 6 miles on final and land. The pilot seemed to
know nothing about instrument flight..." (003)
The seriousness of the possible consequences of improperly flown
approaches can be appreciated through a reading of the following narratives:
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"Small Aircraft A was vectored to a Rwy 27L simultaneous
approach to Chicago O'Hare with a restriction to hold
short of Rwy 32L on landing roll out. I was monitoring
the 27L final and noticed a drift off the localizer to
the right. I made a transmission on the local control
position override to have A stop descent and to turn left
immediately. No immediate response was received from A.
The aircraft made two 360 degree turns on the final.
Aircraft B on the right final had to be given an emer-
gency descent. Wide body transport C was pulled off the
27R final to avoid traffic and small transport D on the
left was also pulled off and descended. This pilot is
obviously unaware of the approach procedures and the area
including the airport since he subsequently got lost on
the ground." (070)
"Small Aircraft A executed two erratic Back Course
approaches to Rwy 11, missing both. A then executed ILS
Rwy 29 approach, during which pilot stated 'I lost it'.
A period of intermittent communications followed. A res-
cue crew was dispatched. A established contact with St.
Louis Approach Control and declared critical fuel.
Approach Control vectored the aircraft to the airport. A
landed Rwy 11 without reported damage or injury. Upon
servicing the aircraft, the FBO advised Alton tower that
A took on 36 gallons (38 gallon capacity). Alton weather
was: SP XX09 local -X M3 OVC 3/4 F 0912. SA XX49 local
-X M4 OVC IF 0915/997." (083)
There is evidence that some pilots do not understand when NOT to execute
a procedure turn maneuver as part of a published instrument approach pro-
cedure. A procedure turn is not to be performed if one of the following con-
ditions is present: (1) the instrument approach procedure chart indicates
"NoPT" (no procedure turn), or "procedure turn NA" (not authorized), or (2)
the approach clearance issued reads "radar vectors to final approach course,"
or "cleared for a straight in approach," or (3) when the approach can be made
from a properly aligned holding pattern. A recent issue of the DOT/FAA
Airman's Information Manual Basic Flight Information and ATC Procedures
Manual reveals a certain lack of information on this subject under the index
heading "Procedure Turn".(6) The FARs contain little about the matter.(7)
The following excerpt from a report narrative illustrates that some IFR sin-
gle pilots think that they must fly a procedure turn.
"Approach Control cleared me for a VOR/DME approach to
Rwy 20L at Nashville. I apparently was being vectored to
intercept the 204 degree radial to track inbound when
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Approach directed me to contact the tower. I immediately
did so, initiated a turn outbound on a heading of 024
degrees and advised the tower of my turn to the right and
that I was heading outbound. The tower did not ack-
nowledge. Approximately 30-40 seconds later as I was
steady on the 024 degree radial outbound, the tower
inquired 'where are you going?' I advised that I was
headed outbound for a procedure turn. Tower instructed
me to standby. I interpreted this to mean continue on
present heading and altitude. The tower also instructed
me to contact Approach Control. Approach vectored me
back in to intercept the 204 degree radial and to track
inbound. I was also admonished that procedure turns are
used only upon instruction or acceptance by the control-
ling facility..." (053)
In summary, there are IFR single pilots who are having difficulty flying
instrument approach procedures properly. The consequences can be serious.
There appears to be a variety of reasons for the performances described dur-
ing this crucial phase of an instrument flight. Lack of skill in flying and
knowledge of how to fly the instrument approach procedure probably contribute
most to the incidence of these occurrences. Lack of skill results from lack
of proficiency and/or lack of thorough instrument flight training. Lack of
knowledge may be a result of inadequate training and/or the absence of recent
familiarization with the important aeronautical information required of a
competent instrument pilot. As to unnecessary procedure turns, a more
thorough treatment of the subject in the AIM and on the instrument rating
written examination would have the potential for reducing the frequency of
these occurrences.
Heading deviation. - Heading deviation occurrences are the fourth most
frequent category of SPIFR operational problems identified in ASRS-2,
accounting for 13 percent of the combined document set. There were 1.5 times
as many altitude deviation occurrences by SMA as by SMT, and 3 times as many
heading deviations. Reports of heading deviations have been submitted by
pilots and controllers, although overwhelmingly by the latter (15 of 16
occurrences, or 94 percent). The characteristics of heading deviations in
the study data set are presented in Table 13.
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The following definitions were applied to the SPIFR heading deviation
occurrences :
A heading overshoot (HO) is an occurrence in which an aircraft flies
through a heading to which it has been cleared.
A heading undershoot (HU) is an occurrence in which an aircraft ter-
minates a heading change short of the heading to which it has been cleared.
A heading excursion (HE) is a deviation left or right of the heading on
which the aircraft has been cleared and which it was maintaining prior to the
excursion.
A heading reversal (HR) is a change of heading opposite in direction to
the heading to which the aircraft has been cleared.
A heading maintained (HM) exists when an aircraft fails to leave its
presently assigned heading for a newly assigned heading.
A premature heading change (HC) occurs when an aircraft initiates a
premature change of heading from its presently assigned heading.
An intentional heading change (HI) occurs when the pilot reported inten-
tionally deviating from his assigned heading.
A heading deviation (HD) is a generic term incorporating all of the
above, and used to code occurrences not having sufficient information to be
assigned a more detailed code.
Where it appeared through a close reading of the narrative that the mind
set contributing factor could explain why the heading deviation occurred, it
was coded using the following abbreviations:
MSF: mind set, flight planned - pilot seeks heading
which will take him to his flight planned route rather
than assigned heading.
MSA: mind set, assigned to another aircraft - pilot
seeks heading which he likely overheard assigned to
another aircraft.
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MSR: mind set, requested - pilot seeks requested rather
than assigned heading.
MSH: mind set, habit - pilot seeks heading by habit
rather than assigned heading.
UNK: reason for heading deviation unknown.
Like altitude deviation occurrences, it is likely that some heading
deviations occur because of misunderstood clearances. Again, given the read-
back redundancy available to compensate for misunderstandings, heading devia-
tions, like altitude deviations, are particularly disturbing. The following
is a clear example of a misunderstood heading clearance:
"Aircraft A departed heading 255 degrees climbing to 4000
MSL. Aircraft B departed heading 210 degrees climbing to
4000 MSL. Aircraft A accepted an instruction issued to a
third aircraft and turned left into Aircraft B...." (006)
Unlike altitude deviation occurrences, the mind set phenomenon did not
emerge as a possible reason for heading deviations. However, workload is
clearly a factor, with 69 percent (11 of 16) heading deviation occurrences
taking place during the departure phase of an IFR flight, versus only 28 per-
cent of the altitude deviations. Another 3 (19 percent) happened during APR
and MAP phases. Only 2 were in the ENR phase. The data do support the
belief that heading deviations occur in the high workload terminal areas,
with 11 (69 percent) coded in Aiport Traffic Area (ATA), Terminal Radar Ser-
vice Area (TRS), and Terminal Control Area (TCA) airspace.
Of the 16 SPIFR aircraft involved in heading deviation occurrences, 12
involved SMA aircraft and 4 SMT aircraft. Heading excursions accounted for
the greatest number of deviations, 7 (44 percent); followed by heading rever-
sal and heading maintained with 3 (19 percent) each, and heading overshoot,
heading deviation, and intentional heading change with only 1 (6 percent)
each. An evasive action, conflict alert, potential conflict, or less than
standard separation was reported in 14 (88 percent) of the occurrences.
Controllers reported 94 percent of the heading deviations. In each case
the controller perceived that the pilot had erred. Since ASRS reports are
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not verified, it is possible that in some occurrences the controller erred,
and the pilot was merely complying with an erroneous heading assignment.
Human error appears in heading deviation occurrences, with 6 (38 per-
cent) involving pilot perception as an enabling factor, and 3 involving pilot
technique.
The following excerpt illustrates that sometimes pilots turn right when
they have been asked to turn left:
"...Aircraft A was assigned 320 degrees then 150 degrees
then left to 020 degrees for vector around Aircraft B.
Aircraft A turned right, which took him into the path of
Aircraft B on final resulting in 300 feet and maybe 1 1/2
miles separation...". (027)
Three of the occurrences (19 percent) involved IFR training operations,
suggesting that instrument flight instructors may be permitting their stu-
dents to proceed too far into a heading deviation before correcting them, to
the extent that a potential conflict and/or less than standard separation
occurs, requiring evasive action:
"...I believe this situation occurred because of bad
flight instructor technique in allowing the student to
deviate from ATC instructions. This seems to be a more
common occurrence all the time. In my opinion the flight
instructors are letting their students go too far to see
if they can discover and recover from errors they have
made in navigating or following ATC instructions. Flight
instructors are still responsible for the flight and to
make certain that ATC instructions and FARs are complied
with. I feel the quality of IFR training is certainly in
question in many accidents." (033)
In summary, the heading deviation occurrence is one of the more fre-
quently reported SPIFR operational problems, with heading excursions being
reported most often. Human error and workload are identifiable factors in
heading deviation occurrences. Efforts to emphasize the importance of head-
ing readback and verification of heading, when in doubt, have the potential
for reducing the incidence of heading deviation occurrences. The instrument
flight instructor practice of letting students experience the consequences of
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their errors could be examined with a focus on their effect on the ATC sys-
tem, with advice disseminated to the instructor population.
Position deviation. - A position deviation occurs when either a con-
troller or the pilot reports that an aircraft has been determined to be some-
where other than where ATC expected it to be. Position deviation occurrences
represent 7 percent of the SPIFR document set. There were 7 SMA occurrences
(2 reported by pilot and 5 by controller) and 2 SMT occurrences (1 each
reported by pilot and controller). Characteristics of position deviations
are shown in Table 14.
All but one of the occurrences happened during the enroute phase of
flight, an anticipated characteristic of position deviations. In all but two
pilot-reported occurrences, the enabling aircraft had not been acquired on
radar before the position deviation took place. More often than not, the
pilot either was not aware of his position deviation, or knowing it, did not
advise ATC. The operational mission (operation) was not likely to be flown
by a professional pilot.
Although the pilot appears to be the cause of most position deviations,
ATC can contribute to the occurrence by issuing a nonradar, no-direct-
communications clearance to a NAVAID out of service because of maintenance:
"....Aircraft A was given a clearance from Jacksonville
Center from Swainsboro, Georgia, Emanuel Co. Aiport to
Dummy intersection, which is made up by the Dublin 210
degree radial and the Vienna 138 degree radial, 21 DME.
Dublin VORTAC was out for maintenance. Non-radar at 6000
feet was approved from Swainsboro to Dummy. This flight
path crossed approximately 40 miles southeast of Macon at
the closest point, just cutting Macon Approach Control
Airspace southeast of Dublin VOR. Aircraft A was radar
identified approximately 15-20 miles east southeast of
Macon out of 2900 feet climbing to 6000 feet. Aircraft B
had just gone through the area at 2000 feet in the radar
pattern at Robins AFB. No direct radio contact had been
established with Aircraft A to this point. All clear-
ances and pilot position reports were relayed by MDA 200
to Jacksonville Center. Aircraft A was on a west
northwest course when he should have been southwest bound
and he was approximately 25 miles, north of course." (001)
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The importance of a clearance confirmation in preventing a position
deviation is illustrated by the following occurrence:
"Pilot had filed for an IFR clearance from Oklahoma City
Expressway Airpark to Oklahoma City VORTAC, then V14 to
Hobart and Childress VORTACS. Clearance received was
Oklahoma City VORTAC to V272, to intercept the 360 degree
radial of Hobart VORTAC then direct to Hobart VORTAC then
to Childress VORTAC and on to Midland, Texas, via origi-
nal IFR flight plan requested. After departure and after
passing Oklahoma City VORTAC on the V272 airway, the
pilot was notified to 'resume own navigation,' correc-
tion, 'assume original flight plan.' Pilot assumed his
request for VIA from Oklahoma City to Hobart to Childress
legs were now approved..." (007)
As shown in the next example, the position deviations can sometimes be
large. Of course, the controller may have heard "Evansville" when the pilot
actually said "Louisville".
"Aircraft A called VFR at 6500 feet and gave his position
as approximately 20 DME west of Evansville tracking
inbound to Evansville on the 225 radial and requested IFR
to Charlotte at 9000 feet. After appropriate coordina-
tion with Evansville Approach Control who owns 8000 feet
in the area, I cleared Aircraft A direct Evansville V4
Louisville flight plan and told him to report Evansville,
as he was below radar coverage in the area. Standiford
Approach Control (the next facility the flight would
enter) called and asked where the flight was as they had
acquired a track on it over the Louisville VOR (approxi-
mately 105 DME east of Evansville VOR)..." (012)
Pilots who do not maintain airways as cleared can cause potential con-
flicts requiring evasive action:
"...At this time I told Aircraft A that he was in radar
contact 1 1/2 miles northwest of Lafayette VOR, 12-13
miles east of V128 — as he was cleared (which I con-
firmed with the pilot). Commuter Aircraft B was depart-
ing Lafayette Airport northbound, over Lafayette VOR
climbing to 6000. B was stopped at 4000 feet in time,
but would not have been if I had not seen A when I did.
This situation occurred because the pilot could not navi-
gate V128 or was cutting the corner." (068)
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If ATC tells a pilot he is somewhere other than where he thinks he is,
he might not agree:
"I frequently fly to MHT Aiport (Manchester, NH) via Bos-
ton VOR 343 degree radial to Pelan intersection, direct
MHT. Consistently Boston Approach Control tells me I'm 6
miles south of Pelan intersection when my own navigation
tells me I'm at Pelan. Pelan is formed by the Boston 343
degree radial and MHT Localizer. I suspect the MHT LOG
has a kink that sends it more southeast than it should.
Since the angle between 343 degrees and 352 degrees is so
small, a small kink could result in a substantial error
in Pelan's location. It's a small thing, but I thought
I'd mention it. Incidentally, my navigation receivers
are properly aligned, so I don't think the problem is in
my radios." (021)
One position deviation occurrence was reported by both controller and
pilot. (124) The controller's analysis suggests that the pilot reported over
an NDB (7.2 NM from Rwy threshold) when inbound on an ILS approach when he
was instead over the OM FAF (3.8 NM from Rwy threshold). The pilot's narra-
tive is somewhat confusing and irrelevant in content suggesting that the FAF
was an LOM, when in fact the NDB was not collocated with the OM in this
approach:
"...Tower controller was trained by FAA to believe that
pilots always (must) report passing Final Approach Fix
(LOM) and predicated separation for departing IFR small
transport Airplane B on this mis-training. Near miss
occurred. The problem is that a pilot report over the
final approach fix (FAF) is only a recommended practice.
However FAA has led people to believe that a report over
the FAF (maltese cross) is required, therefore expected
by controllers when providing separation, creating an
insidious potential hazard for a midair collision." (124)
Experienced instrument flight instructors have noted that one important
characteristic of a skilled instrument pilot is his "positional awareness" —
knowing at all times and without doubt where he is, where he is going, and
how he will get there. This concept of how to operate more safely and effi-
ciently as an instrument pilot is rarely explicitly presented in instrument
flight training programs. Pilots who understand and can consistently apply
the concept of positional awareness are not likely to experience position
23
deviations, or heading and altitude deviations. It would appear that instru-
ment flight training programs, both initial and refresher, could place
increased emphasis on the concept, with the result that IFR single pilots
might indeed operate more safely and efficiently. It is suggested that most
IFR single pilots operate in a first order mode of heading, altitude, and
present position. Positional awareness, however, is a higher order mode of
operation, consisting of an accurate mental picture of one's present and
future location in three dimensional space, and an ability to work with time,
speed, distance, and rates of change of heading, altitude, and position.
In summary, some IFR single pilots are not where ATC thinks they are,
whether or not the pilots know where they are themselves. Emphasis on posi-
tional awareness during instrument flight training could produce safer, more
efficient IFR single pilots.
Below minimums operation. - Seven below minimums operation occurrences
were identified in the SPIFR document set, six involving SMA and one SMT. A
below minimums operation is one in which the actual weather is lower than the
minimums prescribed for the particular operation and a pilot performs a tak-
eoff (2 occurrences), or lands an airplane (4 occurrences), or must divert to
an alternate (1 occurrence). The characteristics of the below minimums
operations are in Table 15.
All three of the below minimums occurrences reported by pilots were air
taxi flights flown by relatively experienced pilots. Cognition encompasses
the behaviors by which a person becomes aware of, and obtains knowledge
about, his relationship to his environment.(8) In both of the takeoff
occurrences, the pilot's cognitive process was involved:
"I departed Rwy 12R thinking that I had my departure
minimum of 1800 feet RVR. Ground Control gave me the RVR
as 1400 but I failed to read back and my misunderstanding
was not detected." (023)
"...I read the takeoff minimums listed on page XII of the
U.S. Government Instrument Approach Procedures — U.S.
South Central Volume 1 of 2 (NOAA) prior to takeoff and
noted them as being 1/2 mile. Although I took off on
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Runway 22, I did not realize until later in the day, that
the published minimums only applied to Runway 4 and not
Runway 22..." (029)
A decision is the formulation of a course of action (from a limited
number of alternatives) with the intent of executing it. (8) A pilot's deci-
sion making process resulted in landing an air taxi flight out of an instru-
ment approach when the weather was reported indefinite ceiling three hundred,
sky obscured, one-eighth mile surface visibility:
"...During the approach I experienced constant missing in
both engines. Upon reaching the Outer Marker I could
clearly see a portion of the Approach Light System due to
breaks in the obscuration. I continued with the
approach, momentarily losing sight of the approach lights
but regaining sight once again one hundred feet above the
Decision Height. Rather than head to another aiport and
have the engines possibly quit somewhere enroute, I
decided to continue the approach since I clearly had the
approach lights in sight and could, at one hundred feet
above Decision Height, see the Runway 5 threshold." (117)
The importance of proper preflight planning in making the important
weather go/no go decision also involves the pilot's decision-making process,
and could prevent "getting into a situation he was very fortunate to sur-
vive:"
"At 2:36 PM a Small Aircraft declared a missed approach
at Akron-Washington Co. Airport, Colorado, to Akron
Radio. He advised that he was encountering moderate
icing conditions, and was unable to climb above 5600 feet
MSL (1000 feet above the terrain). Akron Radio relayed
this information to Denver ARTCC Sector 15 and said that
the weather had just gone to indefinite ceiling zero, sky
obscured, visibility zero in fog (a fast moving winter
storm was moving through the area). Sector 15 advised
Akron FSS to switch aircraft to sector 15 frequency.
Aircraft reported on frequency and advised that he was
unable to climb, had lost his Gyro vacuum system and
airspeed indicator and needed help. A check of alter-
nates showed that Denver was the only field that had
approach minimums. An emergency was declared by Denver
ARTCC and the aircraft was vectored to Buckley ANG Base
and landed safely at 3:31 PM. (Quite a bit transpired
between Akron and Buckley. No airspeed indicator, max-
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imum altitude was 6000 feet MSL, fuel gauges on empty
last 15 minutes.) Cause: Pilot allowed himself to get
into a situation he was very fortunate to survive. Low
on fuel, moderate icing, nearest alternate almost out of
range, minimum IFR equipment installed. Pilot failed to
realize the severity of the fast approaching cold front."
(019)
Landing out of an approach when the weather is reported to be below pub-
lished minimums can have unfortunate results:
"Small Aircraft A departed Roanoke for Bluefield. As
controller, I was working the nonradar Sector for Roanoke
Approach. This is beyond the radar coverage for Roanoke.
The Aircraft came on my freqency and at that time the
Bluefield Weather was below ILS Rwy 23 minimums. Enroute
the weather decreased to ceiling zero, visibility 1/4
mile and fog. He missed on first approach. Later he was
cleared for second approach and turned over to Bluefield
Radio for Advisory Service, and to report his down time
or missed approach to them, as he would be out of Roanoke
Approach radio coverage. Later that night, I was advised
the aircraft had landed, collapsed the gear and was in a
snow bank and the runway was closed. Four persons were
on board with no injuries and the aircraft suffered minor
damage." (073)
In summary, there are SPIFR flights being conducted below minimums. The
number of occurrences is too small to detect any pattern. However, better
preflight weather planning coupled with more conservative go/no go decision
making, and more acute cognitive processes would lessen the incidence of
these occurrences.
Loss of airplane control. - Loss of airplane control during flight in
IMC can have dire consequences. This SPIFR operational problem is a small
but identifiable part of the document set. Characteristics of the
occurrences are in Table 16. All four were reported by SMA pilots. Loss of
control occurs when a pilot reports that he is no longer in control of the
airplane attitude. Except for an apparent wake turbulence encounter, it is
surprising that pilots with the total flight time in these four occurrences
would experience the loss of airplane control reported.
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The mere distraction of tuning VOR receivers has resulted in a loss of
airplane control:
"...After entering the clouds and level at 5000 feet on
an easterly heading which Departure Control had given me,
my No. 1 VOR indicated that the course was west of me.
My No. 2 VOR had the OFF flag showing. While retuning
the VOR'S, I inadvertently rolled into a right bank and
turned to a heading of 180. I then rolled in to a left
turn at which time Departure Control requested my inten-
tions. I said that I was trying to intercept the airway.
Both VOR'S now indicated that I was well east of course.
Departure Control then gave me a right turn direct to New
Hope. Having already started a left turn I requested and
received a left turn direct to New Hope. I then pro-
ceeded direct with no further distractions. I momen-
tarily forgot rule No. 1, fly the airplane." (084)
An apparent wake turbulence encounter provided an instrument flight
instructor and his student with a brief, violent ride:
"Takeoff from Rwy 24 complex, Los Angeles Ventura depar-
ture. Entered overcast at about 1000 MSL, gauges frozen,
everything looking good, IAS 120. IAS went quickly to
186, VSI pegged down direction... I adjusted more and
more nose up on the artificial horizon. It didn't make
much difference on IAS or VSI. (Heading still OK at
255). Suddenly the IAS went up to 190 and decreasing
fast — VSI pegged up, I adjusted for more nose down than
I normally like and got IAS stabilized at 90-100. Nose
started drifting left, I applied more right rudder and
aileron. Controller said turn right to 270 degrees.
Aircraft kept yawing left, me trying to get to 270, got
it stopped at 230. Aircraft suddenly stabilized and I
came around to 280, OK. Scared the hell out of me. I
related my situation to the controller. He stated a
jumbo had passed abeam of my track at about 4000 feet a
few minutes ago. He gave me a telephone number to call
when I arrived at Paso Robles so we could analyze the
situation. Controller told me over the telephone they
had checked everything out and thought the problem may
have been a medium large transport which took off about 6
minutes in front of me. I think the problem was the
jumbo flying abeam of my track because of the initial
pitch-up then pitch down attitude or maybe a combination
of the jumbo and the medium large transport. I have done
a lot of soul searching on this matter — spatial
disorientation — I don't think so. At present wake tur-
bulence seems to be a black art, and really little one
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can do about it when flying IFR, complying with clear-
ances, procedures, etc., in the real world." (014)
An equipment malfunction, combined with a passenger distraction, can
result in abrupt loss of airplane control:
"I was 27 miles northeast of the International Airport at
the Twin Cities at 4000 feet when I lost autopilot and
dropped 1800 feet. I also believed I heard that I was to
start the approach and was turning. I had a baby in the
seat, behind me and she was screaming at the top of her
voice. I started to turn and I suddenly lost the autopi-
lot and dropped 1800 feet. Then approach radar picked me
up. I climbed up to 4000 feet on a vector. They called
me. I explained what happened and as I did not cause any
interference with other aircraft and recovered ade-
quately, they said 'no write up'." (061)
Continuing an IFR flight into an area of turbulence after a vacuum pump
failure had serious consequences:
"1. IFR on top of broken layer and VFR conditions below.
2. After departure I lost vacuum pump. 3. Continued on
top, with VFR conditions below. 4. Entered tops without
gyros and flew on needle ball and airspeed. 5. Entered
turbulence and lost 3000 feet, then climbed 2000 feet and
unable to follow instruments due to turbulence. 6. I
had informed each controller that I had no gyros and was
on top for one hour. 7. In rain and turbulence and
rolled over and also exceeded red line airspeed by 40
MPH. 8. Finally made ground contact (visual) and saw I
was inverted. 9. Rolled out straight and level at red
line plus 30 MPH and requested a no gyro approach in haze
with 3-5 miles visibility. 10. Landed at XYZ — where
aircraft is to be inspected for damage." (059)
To summarize, loss of airplane control, although a small but identifi-
able part of the SPIFR operational problem document set, can have serious
consequences. The importance of basic airplane attitude control while the
pilot is dealing with a problem distraction is evident in these reports. The
FAA has been concerned about the ability of pilots to handle distractions,
and in January, 1980 announced a policy of incorporating into all flight
tests the use of certain distractions during the performance of flight test
maneuvers. In an Advisory Circular, the FAA noted that at the time of their
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next revision, all flight test guides will be changed to include distractions
appropriate to selected flight maneuvers listed under pilot operations(9).
During the interim, FAA inspectors and designated pilot examiners may incor-
porate the use of realistic distractions during the performance of flight
test maneuvers. Although the FAA's concern was a result of findings in a
stall awareness study(lO), on the basis of these occurrences the concept is
also appropriate for instrument flight tests.
ITorgot mandatory report. - Four occurrences in which the IFR single
pilot forgot to make a mandatory report were identified in the SPIFR Document
Set. Two were SMA occurrences, two SMT occurrences. One was reported by the
pilot, three by controllers. Characteristics of the reports are in Table 17.
The Airman's Information Manual, published by the DOT/FAA, and FAR
91.125 specify what reports should be made to ATC or FSS facilities without
request. If a pilot fails to do so, he forgot to make a mandatory report
without request. In addition to these reports, a pilot is expected to report
on a newly assigned frequency. This category of SPIFR operational problem
has too few occurrences to permit meaningful analysis. However, a close
reading of the narratives indicates that each failure to make a mandatory
report involved more than the pilot's simply forgetting.
A flight instructor, for example, permitted his ATP student to land out
of an approach without a landing clearance:
"... While instructing an ATP candidate in multiple
approaches to Runways 8L and 4R at Honolulu, I allowed
the aircraft to be landed without calling Outer Marker
inbound to Tower and monitoring Tower frequency. The
factors that played a part in this event were: 1. use
of headset and boom microphone by the student and yoke
mounted push to talk switch reduces the instructor aware-
ness that a transmission had been made. 2. on all pre-
vious approaches for the last three nights, the con-
troller advised OM and change of frequency lulling the
student into the mode of dependence on the call to report
OM." (025)
Interfacility coordination problems also seem to contribute to a pilot's
tendency to omit making a mandatory report. For example, ATC terminates
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radar service on an IFR flight and makes a nonradar handoff; the pilot then
forgets to make a report over a designated compulsory reporting point but
requests an altimeter setting; the new ATC facility fails to recognize that
the requesting aircraft is IFR; and the flight then proceeds through con-
trolled airspace without being controlled or separated. (074)
If a pilot fails to report on a newly assigned frequency and ATC facili-
ties fail to make a coordinated attempt to recontact the aircraft, flight
safety can be compromised, as illustrated by the following synopsis:
"Center controller told pilot of corporate twin to change
to Approach Control. Pilot acknowledged. Controller
later became concerned when the aircraft came close to
another aircraft which he had also handed off to
Approach. He then learned that the twin was still on his
frequency. Pilot said he thought he had changed. Con-
troller alleges a feud between Approach Control and the
Center, and that Approach deliberately waited for the
incident to occur before taking action." (097)
Departing aircraft operations can be adversely affected when an aircraft
on an instrument approach is not handed off and the pilot forgets to report
to the tower inbound on final approach. (122)
Fuel problem. - Averaging once a day, a general aviation airplane
experiences either fuel exhaustion or fuel starvation(11). Apparently the
SPIFR operation is not immune from the threat, for two fuel problem
occurrences were identified. Characteristics of the occurrence are in Table
18.
In the first (052) a pilot experienced the effects of water contamina-
tion of fuel. He declared an emergency in order to obtain an immediate
approach clearance.
In the second occurrence (087) an air taxi pilot unnecessarily declared
an emergency and diverted to another airport because he perceived that he had
inadequate fuel to proceed to his destination. He checked the fuel during a
preflight inspection by observing fuel gauges which read full. After
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takeoff, the fuel gauges dropped toward empty. Subsequent inspection
revealed that he did have sufficient fuel.
In both cases, a more thorough preflight inspection would have prevented
the occurrence. The experience level of both pilots suggests adequate
experience in preflight planning.
Improper holding. - Holding is an aspect of aeronautical knowledge that
is particularly difficult for the SPIFR to grasp and apply reliably.
Surprisingly, only two improper holding pattern occurrences were identified
in the study dataset, both by SMT. Characteristics of the occurrences are in
Table 19.
An ATC interfacility coordination problem combined with pilots being
uncertain of their clearance resulted in two aircraft passing with less than
standard separation, after ATC issued an evasive action turn to one of them.
(093)
A pilot holding improperly can stray into adjoining airspace, becoming a
hazard to other aircraft with less than standard separation. (098)
A pilot's clear understanding of an ATC holding clearance, combined with
the knowledge of how to fly a holding pattern properly, would reduce the
chances of similar occurrences.
Safety, Efficiency, and Workload Characteristics
of the Single Pilot IFR Operation
The safety, efficiency, and workload characteristics of the SPIFR docu-
ment set occurrences were analyzed in order to assess the seriousness and
significance of the operational problems reported. First, each characteris-
tic was defined in terms of an analytical scheme. Second, the analytical
scheme was applied to each operational problem category. Finally, the
results were tabulated and summarized.
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The analytical schemes are arbitrary and to some extent subjective.
However, the schemes are considered reasonable given the nature of the data
and the objective of the ASRS to provide insights into what problems exist.
Safety. - Safety is freedom from the occurrence or risk of injury or
loss. A useful analytical scheme must have the ability to discriminate the
degree of risk present in a given occurrence. The general scheme for analyz-
ing the safety characteristics of the SPIFR occurrences was suggested by
Chapman (12), and consists of ascertaining which of the following terms best
describes the degree of risk present in each occurrence:
INCIDENT (HIGH RISK): . an .act. or condition likely to lead
to grave consequences, (e.g., midair collision, crash
during an instrument approach, or an occurrence for which
an ASRS Alert Bulletin has been issued.)
ERROR (MEDIUM RISK): an act or condition of ignorant or
imprudent deviation from a code of behavior, (e.g. , alti-
tude deviation or improper holding pattern procedure
where no threat to another aircraft occurred.) Incident
and error were considered to be mutually exclusive.
ANNOYANCE (LOW RISK): a source of irritation causing or
inducing displeasure, as reported by the pilot of the
enabling aircraft.
These terms are further defined for each Operational Problem Category, as
appropriate.
Efficiency. - The impact of SPIFR Operational Problems on the efficient
conduct, of instrument flight was assessed on the basis of the operational
result of the occurrence. An efficient instrument flight is one which is
performed or functions in the best possible and least wasteful manner.
Efficiency was judged to be a characteristic in each SPIFR occurrence if
in:
Single Aircraft Occurrences: The pilot perceived that he
was receiving inadequate service, and it was judged that
his expectation was reasonable.
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V-i-
Multiple Aircraft Occurrences: Other than the enabling
aircraft was requested by ATC to change heading or alti-
tude, or to hold.
Workload. - Workload is the amount of work that the SPIFR is required
to perform. The report content in the ASRS database does not lend itself to
the application of traditional human performance measures of workload. The
cognitive, perceptual, and motor behavioral processes present in the single
piloting of an aircraft IFR cannot be extracted from the ASRS data with any
acceptable degree of accuracy. Indeed, these processes are only usefully
observable in a laboratory setting under carefully controlled and instru-
mented experimental conditions.
As an approximation of the influence of workload in the reported
occurrences, the researcher made an ad hoc decision about its presence or
absence on the basis of the phases of an IFR flight which are generally
regarded as high workload situations for a SPIFR. If the mission phase was a
departure, arrival, approach, missed approach, or hold, then workload was
deemed to have been a factor in the occurrence. Also, if a report narrative
mentioned workload as a factor, the occurrence was counted as having a work-
load characteristic. All below minimums-operation occurrences were assumed
to be workload-related.
The presence of workload as a factor can also be inferred if a pilot's
perception about the real world is different than reality, and his perfor-
mance based upon that perception results in an occurrence. A pilot must have
both the time and the opportunity to correctly assess a real world situation
and act upon it. One important cause of a pilot's perception not matching
reality is because of workload and it appeared that this was the case in 28
percent of the reports in this study data set. Therefore, all reports in the
data set analyzed as containing pilot perception as an enabling factor were
tabulated under workload.
Safety characteristics by operational problem category.
• Inadequate Service
INCIDENT occurred if an Alert Bulletin has been issued.
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ERROR occurred if the pilot's expectation was judged to
be reasonable.
ANNOYANCE occurred in each pilot allegation of inadequate
service.
• Altitude Deviation
INCIDENT occurred if any of the following factors were
present: evasive action, conflict alert, potential con-
flict, less than standard separation.
ERROR occurred if an incident did not occur.
ANNOYANCE occurred if indicated by pilot reporter.
• Improperly Flown Approach
Same as Altitude Deviation. In addition, the occurrence
was classified as an incident where analyst judgement
dictated.
• Heading Deviation
Same as Altitude Deviation.
• Position Deviation
Same as Altitude Deviation.
• Below Minimums Operation
INCIDENT occurred if an aircraft accident ensued in some
part of the approach or landing.
, ERROR existed in all below minimums operation
occurrences.
• Loss of Airplane Control
INCIDENT was determined to be applicable to each
occurrence.
• Forgot Mandatory Report
Same as Altitude Deviation.
• Fuel Problem
INCIDENT occurred if an emergency was declared.
ERROR occurred if an incident did not occur.
ANNOYANCE occurred if indicated by pilot reporter.
• Improper Holding
Same as Altitude Deviation.
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A summary of the analyses of safety, efficiency, and workload charac-
teristics of the Single Pilot IFR Operation is presented by Operational Prob-
lem Category in Tables 20 and 21.
In terms of safety, 52 percent of the SPIFR document set occurrences
involved an incident, 35 percent involved an error, and 36 percent an annoy-
ance. The efficiency of IFR flight was adversely affected in 37 percent of
the occurrences. Applying the mission phase determinant of workload as a
factor resulted in 73 percent of the SPIFR occurrences being categorized as
workload-related. Applying the pilot perception enabling factor as a deter-
minant resulted in 28 percent of the occurrences being categorized as work-
load related.
CONCLUSIONS
1. Ten SPIFR Operational Problem Categories have been identified in the
ASRS-2 database. In order of decreasing frequency of occurrence, they
are: Pilot Allegations of Inadequate Service (30 percent), Altitude
Deviation (20 percent), Improperly Flown Approach (15 percent), Heading
Deviation (13 percent), Position Deviation (7 percent), Below Minlmums
Operations (6 percent), Loss of Airplane Control (3 percent), Forgot Man-
datory Report (3 percent), Fuel Problem (2 percent), and .Improper Holding
(2 percent).
2. It appears that the operational problems being experienced by the SPIFR
may be independent of experience. Although this hypothesis needs to be
tested more thoroughly, it is suggested that if the hypothesis were found
to be valid then remedies to SPIFR operational problems do not lie in
improving SPIFR capabilities through more training and experience.
Rather, the nature of the SPIFR task should be changed through the
redesign of cockpit systems and ATC procedures in handling the SPIFR.
3. Safety, Efficiency, and Workload factors are present in SPIFR Operational
Problem occurrences. Half of the occurrences involved an act or condi-
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tion likely to lead to grave consequences, and one-third involved an act
or condition of ignorant or imprudent deviation from acceptable pro-
cedures. In more than one-third of the occurrences, the efficiency of
IFR flight was affected. Depending upon what determinant is used to
assess workload, between one-quarter and three-quarters of the
occurrences involved workload as a causal factor.
4. The most frequently identified SPIFR Operational Problem was a pilot's
allegation of inadequate service. Three-quarters of such allegations are
deemed reasonable.
5. A pilot's "mind set" was a factor in altitude deviations, appearing in 68
percent of the occurrences.
6. Lack of pilot proficiency is apparent in improperly flown approach
occurrences. In 22 percent of these occurrences, there was evidence that
pilots did not understand when not to execute a procedure turn.
7. The pilot's lack of awareness of his position is an important factor in
position deviation occurrences.
8. Takeoff below minimums occurrences were related to the pilot's cognitive
processes. Landing below minimums occurrences probably could have been
prevented by better preflight weather planning and more conservative
decision making by the pilot.
9. Loss of airplane control generally followed the pilot being distracted.
Even relatively experienced pilots lost airplane control.
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TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF SEARCH STRATEGIES USED TO
FORM THE SINGLE PILOT IFR OPERATIONAL
PROBLEMS DOCUMENT SET
Search Factor
Small Aircraft Small Transport Aircraft
One Aircraft
Present
More Than One
Aircraft
One Aircraft
Present
More Than One
Aircraft
NUMBER OF REPORTS IN ASRS DATABASE
Date of Search
Reports Current as of
Total Reports
12-10-80
11-25-80
13,961
03-18-81
03-17-81
15,246
DOCUMENT SET CRITERIA
ATYP
FPLAN, IFR
FCON, IMC
AFRAM, ER
AFRAM, ET
TACFT
Reports Satisfying
All Criteria
4,765
10,665
1,824
-
-
4,541
91
8,335
219
1
3,264
11,715
1,979
6,418
2,375
5,009
101
9,094
201
DOCUMENT SET DETERMINATION
Reports Deleted
Reports Added
Document Set
Reports
Occurrences
Reports
Occurrences
Reports
Occurrences
29
-
62
60
188
2
33
28
95
88
87
1
15
14
178
3
26
22
41
36
136
124
41
TABLE 2. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS
Operational Problem
Number -of Items
One Aircraft
Present.
Reports Occurrences
More Than One
Aircraft Present
Reports Occurrences
Total
Reports Occurrences
Percent
Total
Occurrences
SMA SPIFR DOCUMENT SET
1 Inadequate Service
2 Altitude Deviation
3 Improperly Flown
Approach
4 Heading Deviation
5 Position Deviation
6 Below Minimums
Operation
7 Loss of Airplane
Control
8 Forgot Mandatory Report
9 Fuel Problem
10 Improper Holding
Total
27 27
5 5
10 8
1 1
5 5
6 6
4 4
2 2
2 2
--
62 60
11 10
7 5
13 11
2 2
-_
-.
-_
-_
--
33 28
27 27
16 15
17 13
14 12
7 7
6 6
4 4
2 2
2 2
--
95 88
31
17
15
14
8
7
5
2
2
—
—
SMT SPIFR DOCUMENT SET
1 Inadequate Service
2 Altitude Deviation
3 Improperly Flown
Approach
4 Heading Deviation
5 Posi tion Deviation
6 Below Minimums
Operation
7 Loss of Airplane
Control
8 Forgot Mandatory Report
9 Fuel Problem
10 Improper Holding
Total
n 10
--
2 2
_.
__
1 1
_.
1 1
-r
—
15 14
..
10 10
6 3
4 4
3 2
.-
__
1 1
—2 2
26 22
11 10
10 10
8 5
4 4
3 2
1 1
__
2 2
_-
2 2 -
41 36
28
28
14
11
6
3
—6
-_
6
--
COMBINED SMA AND SMT SPIFR DOCUMENT SET
1 Inadequate Service
2 Altitude Deviation
3 Improperly Flown
Approacn
4 Heading Deviation
5 Position Deviation
6 Below Minimums
Operation
7 Loss of Airplane
Control
8 Forgot Mandatory Report
9 Fuel Problem
10 Improper Holding
Total
38 37
5 5
12 10
1 1
5 5
7 7
4 4
3 3
2 2
--
77 74
21 20
13 8
17 15
5 4
-.
-.
1 1
_-
2 2
59 50
38 37
26 25
25 18
18 16
10 9
7 7
4 4
4 4
2 2
2 2
136 124
30
20
15
13
7
6
3
3
2
2
--
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TABLE 3. OPERATIONAL PROBLEM BY REPORTER AND TYPE OF OPERATION
Operational Problem
Reported By
PLT CTR AIR
Operation
PAX FRT CHR TRN PLS UTL PRB UNK
SMA DATA SET
1 Inadequate Service
2 Altitude Deviation
3 Improperly Flown Approach
4 Heading Deviation
5 Position Deviation
6 Below Minimums Operation
7 Loss of Airplane Control
8 Forgot Mandatory Report
9 Fuel Problem
10 Improper Holding
Total Number
Total Percent
27
'3
4
1
2
2
4
1
2
-
46
52
.
11 1
9
11
5
4
-
1
-
-
41 1
47 1
3
1
-
-
-
1 1
-
-
1
-
5 2
6 2
5 5 2
1 4
1 1 3 -
3 1
2 1
2 1
1 1
1
- - .- -
_
1 12 18 4
1 14 20 5
7
4
4
2
2
-
2
-
1
-
22
25
5
5
4
6
2
1
-
1
-
-
24
27
SMT DATA SET
1 Inadequate Service
2 Altitude Deviation
3 Improperly Flown Approach
4 Heading Deviation
5 Position Deviation
6 Below Minimums Operation
7 Loss of Airplane Control
8 Forgot Mandatory Report
9 Fuel Problem
10 Improper Holding
Total Number
Total Percent
9
1
2
-
1
1
-
-
_
-
14
39
1
9
3
4
1
-
-
2
_
2
21 1
58 3
5
2
3
1
1
1
-
-
-
1
13 1
36 3
2 - - -
1
1 - - -
1 - - -_
- - - -
_
_
_ _ - -
- - - -
4 i
n 3
1
3
1
1
1
-
-
-
-
1
8
22
2
4
-
1
-
-
-
2
-
-
9
25
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TABLE 4. OPERATOR ORGANIZATION VERSUS TYPE OF OPERATION
OPERATOR
ORGANIZATION
Operation (Mission) Type
PAX FRT CHR TRN PLS UTL PRB UNK
Total
Number Percent
SMA DATA SET
ATX
FBO
RNT
CPR
PER
STA
UTO
UNK
Total Number
Total Percent
1 2 - 1 - 1 1 2
1 i . . .
3 2 1
4 - - - - - - 2
4 15 - 15 -
1
. . . . .
 2
3 3 3 4 16
5 2 1 12 18 4 22 24
6 2 1 14 20 5 25 27
8
2
6
6
34
1
2
29
88
-
9
2
7
7
39
1
2
33
-•
100
SMT DATA SET
ATX
FBO
RNT
CPR
PER
STA
UTO
UNK
Total Number
Total Percent
8 1 3 2
- -
1
4 - - - . - 2 6
1 - - - 1 - 6 1
-
.
-
1 3 1 4 1 - 8 9
36 3 11 - 3 - 22 25
14
-
1
12
9
-
-
-
36
-
39
-
3
33
25
-
-
-
-
100
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TABLE 5. OPERATIONAL PROBLEM BY PHASE OF FLIGHT
Operational Problem
Phase of Flight
PRE TOF ICB CLB CRS DES APR HLD MAP DIV ALL
SMA DATA SET
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Inadequate Service
Altitude Deviation
Improperly Flown Approach
Heading Deviation
Position Deviation
Below Minimums Operation
Loss of Airplane Control
Forgot Mandatory Report
Fuel Problem
Improper Holding
Total Number
Total Percent
2 2 - 2
4
. . .
2 6
- - _ .
2
1
-
1
-
2 4 2 14
2 5 2 16
9
2
-
2
7
-
2
1
1
-
24
27
1 6
3 4 1
10
2_
3
1
1
_
- - -
4 27 1
5 31 1
5
1
3_
_
1_
.
-
-
4 1 5
5 1 6
SMT DATA SET
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Inadequate Service
Altitude Deviation
Improperly Flown Approach
Heading Deviation
Position Deviation
Below Minimums Operation
Loss of Airplane Control
Forgot Mandatory Report
Fuel Problem
Improper Holding
Total Number
Total Percent
1
6
-
4
- • -
-
-
-
-
-
11
31
5
1
-
-
1
-
-
-
_
-
7
19
1 3
3
5
_
1
1
. . .
1 1_
2
5 11 2
14 31 6
_ _ _
_
_
_
-
.
.
_
-
-
_ - _
_ _
TABLE 6. OPERATIONAL PROBLEM BY PILOT TOTAL FLIGHT TIME
Operational Problem
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
250- 500-
499 999
SMA DATA
Inadequate Service
Altitude Deviation
Improperly Flown Approach
Heading Deviation
Position Deviation
Below Minimums Operation
Loss of Airplane Control
Forgot Mandatory Report
Fuel Problem
Improper Holding
Total Number
Total Percent
4 4
-
1 1
-
2
-
-
-
-
-
7 5
8 6
SMT DATA
Inadequate Service
Altitude Deviation
Improperly Flown Approach
Heading Deviation
Position Deviation
Below Minimums Operation
Loss of Airplane Control
Forgot Mandatory Report
Fuel Problem
Improper Holding
Total Number
Total Percent
1
-
-_
-
-
-
_
-
1
3
Total
1000-
1999
SET
1
-
-
-
-
1
2
-
-
-
4
5
SET
.
-
1
-
_
1
-
-_
-
2
6
Flight Time—Mrs
2000-
2999
3
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1
-
4
5
2
-
1
-
_
-
-
-
.
-
3
8
3000-
3999
5
1
1
-
-
-
1
-
1
-
9
10
-
-
-
_
-
-
-
_
-
_
-
4000-
or More
6
1
-
-
-
1
1
-
-
-
9
10
6
-
-
-
_
-
-
-
_
-
6
17
Unknown
or Not
Reported
4
13
10
12
5
4
-
2
-
-
50
57
2
9
3
4
2
-
-
2
_
2
24
67
46
TABLE 7. OPERATIONAL PROBLEM BY PILOT TIME IN LAST 90 DAYS
Operational Problem
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Flight Time
Less 10- 25-
Than 10 24 49
SMA
Inadequate Service
Altitude Deviation
Improperly Flown Approach
Heading Deviation
Position Deviation
Below Minimums Operation
Loss of Airplane Control
Forgot Mandatory Report
Fuel Problem
Improper Holding
Total Number
Total Percent
1 4 5
.
1
.
1_
2
_
1
- -
2 5 8
2 6 9
SMT
Inadequate Service
Altitude Deviation
Improperly Flown Approach
Heading Deviation
Position Deviation
Below Minimums Operation
Loss of Airplane Control
Forgot Mandatory Report
Fuel Problem
Improper Holding
Total Number
Total Percent
_ _ _
.
.
_ _
.
.
.
-
.
- -
_ _
- -
50-
99
DATA SET
4
-
1
1
1
1
1
-
-
-
9
10
DATA SET
_
1
1
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
2
6
100-
149
_
1
-
-
-
-
1
-
-
-
2
2
2
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
2
6
Last 90
150-
199
'3
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
3
3
2
-
-
-
-
1
-
-
-
-
3
8
Days— Hrs
200-
249
3
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
3
3
3
-
1
-
-
-
.
-
-
-
4
11
250- 300-
299 or More
2
-
-
-
-
1
-
-
1
-
2 2
2 2
1
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1
3
Unknown
or Not
Reported
5
14
11
11
5
4
-
2
-
-
52
59
2
9
3
4
2
-
-
2
-
2
24
67
47
TABLE 8. OPERATIONAL PROBLEM BY AIRFRAME CHARACTERISTICS
Operational Problem
1 Inadequate Service
2 Altitude Deviation
3 Improperly Flown Approach
4 Heading Deviation
5 Position Deviation
6 Below Minimums Operation
7 Loss of Airplane Control
8 Forgot Mandatory Report
9 Fuel Problem
Total Number
Total Percent
1 Inadequate Service
2 Altitude Deviation
3 Improperly Flown Approach
4 Heading Deviation
5 Position Deviation
6 Below Minimums Operation
8 Forgot Mandatory Report
10 Improper Holding
Total Number
Total Percent
Wing
WH WL WU
SMA DATA SET
7 19 1
6 8 1
3 10 -
6 6 -
4 3 -
1 5
1 3
1 1
1 1
30 56 2
34 64 2
SMT DATA SET
2 8
1 9
3 2
1 3
2
1
2
2
7 29 -
19 81
Landing
Gear
LF LR LU
10 15 2
7 7 1
5 8
4 8 -
4 2 1
2 4
1 3
2
1 1
34 50 4
39 57 5
- 10
- 10
1 4
1 3
2
1
2
1 1
3 33
8 92 -
Engine
Type
ER ET EU
26 - 1
15
13
12
7
6
4
2
2
87 - 1
99 - 1
7 3
6 4
4 1
4
2
1
1 1
2
27 9
75 25
Number
Engines
1 2 U
23 3 1
13 2
12 1
9 3 -
6 1
4 2 -
2 1 1
1 1
2
72 14 2
82 16 2
- 10
- 10
5
4
2
1
2
2
- 36
- 100
48
TABLE 9. SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCES INVOLVING PILOT
ALLEGATIONS OF INADEQUATE SERVICE
Occurrence of
Inadequate Service
Inadequate Service From ATC
Radio COM Reception
Aviation Weather Reporting
NAVAID
Total
Document Set
SMA
Number Percent
17 63
5 19
4 15
1 4
27
SMT
Number Percent
6 60
-
1 10
3 30
10
Total
Number Percent
23 62
5 13
5 13
4 11
37
49
TABLE 10. PILOT'S EXPECTATION EXPRESSED IN EACH ALLEGATION
OF INADEQUATE SERVICE
Occurrence
Document
Set
091
002
008
on
013
094
017 ,
028
031
104
105
038
042
no
. 045
049
054
055
058
064
066
114
075
SMT
SMA
SMA
SMA
SMA
SMT
SMA
SMA
SMA
SMT
SMT
SMA
SMA
SMT
SMA
SMA
SMA
SMA
SMA
SMA
SMA
SMT
SMA
Phase
of
Flight
Pilot Expectation
Not Satisfied
INADEQUATE SERVICE FROM ATC
CLB
CRS
CRS
CRS
APR
APR
CRS
APR
DES
CRS
APR
CRS
ALL
CRS
ALL
CRS
CLB
CRS
ALL
APR
CRS
CRS
APR
Controllers should not whistle loud
enough that I can hear them over
frequency.
The next air traffic controller will
know I have been handed off to him.
ATC will inform me when radar contact
is lost.
I can obtain a timely IFR clearance
in flight.
Approach control will inform me of a
circling approach before being handed
off to the tower.
I should be able to obtain NOTAMS dur-
ing a FSS briefing.
ATC will assign me a new frequency when
I have been handed off.
ATC won't interrupt a practice instrument
approach.
When I- have to make a precautionary
landing, ATC can try to find a suitable
airport for me.
ATC will not cancel my IFR clearance.
Approach control should not close down
at quitting time and terminate my ASR
approach during IMC.
ATC radar can provide me weather avoidance.
ATC won't forget about me in a non-radar
environment.
ATC will assign me a new frequency when
I have been handed off.
My flight plan information will be pro-
cessed accurately.
ATC will not radar vector me toward terrain
ATC will not clear me to an initial fix
which is out of service.
ATC won't forget about me.
ATC should provide me radar coverage
throughout the entire flight.
ATC won't radar vector me below minimum
vectoring altitude in the vicinity of
tall towers.
ATC won't forget about me.
ATC will know my intended destination.
The ATC tower should be able to turn off
the sequenced flashers on an ILS approach
lighting system.
Expectation
Reasonable
YES
YES
YES
NO
YES
YES
YES
NO
YES
YES
YES
NO
YES •
YES
YES
NO
YES
YES
NO
YES
YES
YES
NO
50
Occurrence
Document
Set
Phase
of
Flight
Pilot Expectation
Not Satisfied
Expectation
Reasonable
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS RECEPTION
026 ''
036 :
044
050
057
SMA
SMA
SMA
SMA
SMA
ALL
ALL
TOP
TOP
CLB
I should be able to communicate with
ATC above the minimum enroute altitude.
ATC should be able to receive my trans-
missions during the execution of a missed
approach.
I should be able to communicate with
someone on the airport by radio when de-
parting IFR from an airport with a closed
runway.
I should be able to get an IFR clearance
by radio on the ground.
Aircraft communications frequencies should
be free from interference.
YES
YES
NO
NO
YES
AVIATION WEATHER REPORTING
100
030
032
046
063
SMT
SMA
SMA
SMA
SMA
DES
APR
PRE
PRE
CRS
ATC will not vector us into a known em-
bedded thunderstorm. (Reported by a
passenger who is also a pilot.)
Timely weather information should be
available for an approach into an airport
without an ATC tower or FSS, but with NWS.
When weather is known to be IMC in a
terminal area, PIREPs should be available
for the terminal area during a weather
briefing.
I should be able to get through to a FSS
by telephone for a weather briefing.
FSS briefers will have current information
about thunderstorm activity along my pro-
posed route of flight.
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
NAVAID
090
089
103
040
SMT
SMT
SMT
SMA
APR
CRS
CRS
APR
A LOC will not have a bend in it.
An MEA gap should not exist with high
terrain on both sides of it.
A NDB frequency should be in the frequency
band of a digital ADF receiver.
An NDB navigation signal will be reliable.
YES
NO
YES
YES
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TABLE 11. CHARACTERISTICS OF ALTITUDE DEVIATION OCCURRENCES
Occurrence
Type of
Altitude
Deviation
Evasive
Action
CA, PC,
LTSS Factor Mission Phase Airspace Operation
No. of
Aircraft
Involved
SMA ALTITUDE DEVIATIONS, PILOT REPORTER
069
079
080
AO
AE
AC
-
-
-
_
-
-
MSF
UNK
MSH
ENR
APR
APR
OCA
OCA
OCA
PRB
PRB
PRB
SMA ALTITUDE DEVIATIONS, CONTROLLER REPORTER
020
024
034
039
041
048
065
072
076
077
081
AO
AO
AO
AO
AO
AO
AM
AO
AU
AO
AC
YES
ATC
ATC
YES
ATC
-
ATC
ATC
-
-
-
-
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
-
-
-
YES
MSA
MSA
MSA
MSA
MSA
MSA
MSA
MSA
UNK
MSF
UNK
DEP
APR
ENR
DEP
HLD
APR
ARR
ENR
MAP
DEP
ARR
TRS
PCA
AIR
PCA
OCA
OCA
OCA
OCA
ATA
AIR
OCA
UNK
PAX
PLS
UNK
PAX
PLS
PLS
UNK
TRN
PLS
UNK
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
2
SMA ALTITUDE DEVIATIONS, AIR FORCE REPORTED
082 AU YES YES MSA HLD TRS UNK 2
SMT ALTITUDE DEVIATIONS, PILOT REPORTER
092 AO ATC - UNK ARR AIR PRB 2
SMT ALTITUDE DEVIATIONS, CONTROLLER REPORTER
096
099
106
108
112
115
118
120
121
AO
AO
AC
AO
AO
AM
AO
AO
AO
UNK
ATC
-
ATC
ATC
-
ATC
ATC
-
YES
-
-
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
UNK
MSR
UNK
MSR
MSA
UNK
MSA
MSA
UNK
DEP
DEP
ARR
ENR
DEP
ARR
ENR
DEP
ENR
OCA
AIR
OCA
AIR
OCA
OCA
AIR
ATA
OCA
PRB
PLS
PRB
PAX
PAX
UNK
UNK
UNK
UNK
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
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TABLE 12. CHARACTERISTICS OF IMPROPERLY FLOWN APPROACH OCCURRENCES
Occurrence
Evasive
Action
CA, PC,
LTSS
Type
of
Approach
Radar
Available
Number
of
Engines
Pilot Time
Total
Last
90 Days Operation
Recovery
Factors
No. of
Aircraft
Involved
SMA IMPROPERLY FLOWN APPROACHES, PILOT REPORTER
004
"010
035
053
.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
ILS
VOR
LOC BC
VOR DME
YES
UNK
PRB
YES
1
1
1
1
670
400
3600
UNK
75
1
UNK
UNK
CHR
TRN
PRB
UNK
NON
NON
NON
ATC
1
1
1
1
SMA IMPROPERLY FLOWN' APPROACHES, CONTROLLER REPORTER
003
022
043
051
056
060
070
083
086
-
ATC
ATC
ATC
-
ATC
ATC
- .
ATC
-
-
YES
YES
-
YES
-
-
YES
VOR
ILS
ILS
ILS
ILS
ILS
ILS
LOC BC
VOR
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
YES
YES
YES
UNK
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
UNK
UNK
UNK
UNK
UNK
UNK
UNK
UNK
UNK
UNK
UNK
UNK
UNK
UNK
UNK
UNK
UNK
UNK
UNK
PLS
PRB
UNK
PRB
PLS
PRB
UNK
PLS
NON
NON
ATC
NON
NON
ATC
ATC
ATC
ATC
1
4
>1
2
1
2
4
1
2
SMT .IMPROPERLY FLOWN APPROACHES, PILOT REPORTER
109
119
_
-
YES
-
ILS
NDB
YES
PRB
2
2
2200
1262
200
69
CHR
PRB
ATC
NON
2
1
SMT IMPROPERLY FLOWN APPROACHES, CONTROLLER REPORTER
101
113
116
.
NON
NTM
-
-
-
NDB
CTC
ILS
YES
YES
PRB
2
2
2
UNK
UNK
UNK
UNK
UNK
UNK
PAX
PAX
PAX
ATC
NON
FLC
1
2
2
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TABLE 13. CHARACTERISTICS OF HEADING DEVIATION OCCURRENCES
Occurrence
Type of
Heading
Deviation
Evasive
Action
CA, PC,
LTSS Factor Mission Phase Airspace Operation
No. of
Aircraft
Involved
SMA HEADING DEVIATIONS, PILOT REPORTER
071 HI - - DEP ATA UNK 2
SMA HEADING DEVIATIONS, CONTROLLER REPORTER
005
006
009
015
018
027
033
047
062
078
085
HE
HE
HR
HE
HE
HR
HE
HM
HM
HR
HE
ATC
ATC
-
-
ATC
ATC
ATC
ATC
ATC
ATC
-
YES
YES
-
YES
YES
YES
-
YES
YES
YES
YES
MSA
MSA
UNK
UNK
UNK
UNK
MSF
UNK •
UNK
UNK
UNK
MAP
DEP
DEP
ENR
ENR
APR
DEP
DEP
DEP
DEP
APR
ATA
TRS
ATA
OCA
AIR
TRS
ATA
ATA
OCA
TCA
OCA
TRN -
UNK
UNK
PRB
PLS
UNK
TRN
TRW
PRB
UNK
UNK
2
2
1
2
2
?.
2
2
2
2
2
SMT HEADING DEVIATIONS, CONTROLLER REPORTER
102
107
111 '
123
HD
HE
HO
HM
-
ATC
ATC
ATC
YES
YES
YES
YES
UNK
UNK
UNK
UNK
DEP
DEP
DEP
DEP
TRS
OCA
ATA
ATA
CHR
PRB
UNK
PAX
2
2
2
2
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TABLE 14. CHARACTERISTICS OF POSITION DEVIATION OCCURRENCES
Occurrence
Evasive
Action
CA, PC,
LTSS Mission Phase Airspace Operation
No. of
Aircraft
Involved
Radar
ID Before
Deviation
SMA POSITION DEVIATIONS, PILOT REPORTER
007
021
-
-
-
-
ENR
ENR
SMA POSITION DEVIATIONS,
001
012
067
068
088
-
-
-
YES
-
YES
-
-
YES
-
ENR
ENR
ENR
ENR
ENR
AIR
CZN
CONTROLLER
TRS
AIR
AIR
OCA
AIR
PRB
PRB
1
1
YES
YES
REPORTER
UNK
PLS
UNK
PLS
UTL
SMT POSITION DEVIATIONS, PILOT REPORTER
124 - YES APR ATA
SMT POSITION DEVIATIONS, CONTROLLER
095 - - ENR OCA
PAX
3
1
2
2
1
2
REPORTER
PRB 2
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
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TABLE 15. CHARACTERISTICS OF BELOW MIHIMUMS OPERATION OCCURRENCES
Occurrence
Mission
Phase Airspace Organization Operation
Number of
of Engines
Pilot Flight Time
Total
Last
90 Days
SMA BELOW MINIMUMS OPERATION, PILOT REPORTER
023
029
TOP
TOP
016
019
037
073
117
LOG
MAP
LOG
LOG
APT
APT
ATX
ATX
UTL
FRT
2
1
4,450
1,800
SMA BELOW MINIMUMS OPERATION, CONTROLLER REPORTER
OCA
AIR
TRS
CZN
CPR
PER
UNK
PER
PAX
PLS
UNK
PLS
2
1
1
1
UNK
UHK
UNK
UNK
65
300
UNK
UNK
UNK
UNK
SMT BELOW MINIMUMS OPERATION, PILOT REPORTER
LOG ATA ATX FRT 2 1,875 165
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TABLE 16. CHARACTERISTICS OF LOSS OF AIRPLANE CONTROL OCCURRENCES
Occurrence
014
059
061
084
Mission Phase
DEP
ENR
APR
ENR
Airspace
TCA
AIR
OCA
OCA
Operation
TRN
PRB
PLS
PRB
Number of
of Engines
1
1
UNK
2
Pilot Flight Time
Last
Total 90 Days
3,000 100
1,040 28
1,550 28
4,000 75
TABLE 17. CHARACTERISTICS OF FORGOT MANDATORY REPORT OCCURRENCES
Occurrence
025
074
Evasive
Action
-
-
CA, PC,
LTSS Mission Phase
SMA FORGOT MANDATORY REPORT,
-
SMA FORGOT
-
APR '
Airspace Operation
Mo. of
Aircraft
Involved
PILOT REPORTER
TCA TRN 1
MANDATORY REPORT, CONTROLLER REPORTER
ENR AIR UNK 1
SMT FORGOT MANDATORY REPORT, CONTROLLER REPORTER
097
122 - -
ENR
APR
AIR
ATA
UNK
UNK
2
2
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TABLE 18. CHARACTERISTICS OF FUEL PROBLEM OCCURRENCES
Occurrence Mission Phase
Number
of Engines
Pilot Flight Time
Last
Total 90 Days Operation
SMA FUEL PROBLEM, PILOT REPORTER
052
087
ENR
DEP
1
1 -
2,700 40
3,500 300
PRB
FRT
TABLE 19. CHARACTERISTICS OF IMPROPER
HOLDING OCCURRENCES
Occurrence
Evasive
Action
CA, PC,
LTSS
ASRS
Mission
Phase
Number
of Engines Operation
SMT IMPROPER HOLDING, CONTROLLER REPORTER
093
098
ATC
• -
YES
YES
HLD
HLD
2
2
PAX
PRB
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TABLE 20. NUMBER OF SPIFR OPERATIONAL PROBLEM OCCURRENCES INVOLVING
SAFETY, EFFICIENCY, AND WORKLOAD CHARACTERISTICS
Operational Problem
1 Inadequate Service
2 Altitude Deviation
3 Improperly Flown Approach
4 Heading Deviation
5 Position Deviation
6 Below Minimums Operation
7 Loss of Airplane Control
8 Forgot Mandatory Report
9 Fuel Problem
10 Improper Holding
Totjl
Safety
Incident
5
19
14
14
3
1
4
0
2
2
64
Error
20
3
4
2
4
6
0
4
0
0
43
Annoyance
37
1
3
1
3
0
0
0
0
0
45
Efficiency
27
6
5
5
1
0
0
1
0
1
46
Workload
Mission
Phase
21
20
18
14
2
7
3
2
1
2
90
Pilot
Perception
5
13
7
6
1
2
0
0
0
1
35
TABLE 21. PERCENTAGE OF SPIFR OPERATIONAL PROBLEM OCCURRENCES INVOLVING
SAFETY, EFFICIENCY, AND WORKLOAD CHARACTERISTICS
One-rational Problem
1 Inadequate Service
<! Altitude Deviation
3 Improperly Flovn Approach
^ iiuadin>; Deviation
5 Position Deviation
f> iiuluw Mininiuras Operation
7 Loss of Airplane Control
S K:ir:.;ot Mandatory Report
') Fuel i'roblera
10 Improper Holding
Total
Safety
Incident
14
76
78
88
33
14
100
0
100
100
52
Error
54
12
22
13
44
86.
0
100
0
0
35
Annoyance
100
4
17
6
33
0
0
0
0
0
36
Efficiency
73
24
28
31
11
0
0
25
0
50
37
Workload
Mission
Phase
57
80
100
88
22
100
75
50
50
100
73
Pilot
Perception
14
52
39
38
11
29
0
0
0
50
28
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APPENDIX B
SUMMARY OF ASRS ACCESSION NUMBERS
BY OPERATIONAL PROBLEM CATEGORY
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Page Intentionally Left Blank
SMALL TRANSPORT DOCUMENT SET
INADEQUATE SERVICE (11)
Inadequate Service From ATC (6)
08981, 11265, 13329, 13707, 14708, 18077
Aviation Weather Reporting (1)
12166
NAVAID (4)
08866,® 08948, 10591,® 13122
ALTITUDE DEVIATION (10)
09645, 11608, 12148, 13833, 13967, 16386, 18138
18975, 19664, 19844
IMPROPERLY FLOWN APPROACH (8)
13074, 13970,® 13996,® 16461,® 16462,® 18664,0 18665,®
19214
HEADING DEVIATION (4)
13095, 13069, 15515, 22308
POSITION DEVIATION (3)
11593, 22375,® 22449©
BELOW MIMIHUMS OPERATION (1)
18772
FORGOT MANDATORY REPORT (2)
11707, 20595
IMPROPER HOLDING (2)
09774, 11735
=
 same occurrence
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SMALL AIRCRAFT DOCUMENT SET
INADEQUATE SERVICE (27)
Inadequate Service from ATC (17)
09203, 10343^10750,
14154, 14574, 14907,
16564, 17464, 18503
Radio Convnurncations Reception (5)
12742,13944,14903,
Aviation Weather Reporting (4)
13121,
NAVAID (1)
14282
13419. 15196,
11145,
15536,
15627,
16504
ALTITUDE DEVIATION (16)
11900, 12551
16703,© 17654
19221, 19957
13849,
18274,
14266,
18571,
JMPP.OPERLY FLOWN APPROACH (17)
09854, 09943,
14774 ,(D 15660,©
17692, 20221,
HEADING DEVIATION (14)
10198, 10339,
13601, 15287 ,<D
POSITION DEVIATION (7)
08873, 10342,
DELOH MinmUMS OPERATION (6)
11634, 11876,
LOSS OF AIRPLANE CONTROL (4)
11206, 16209,
FORGOT MANDATORY REPORT (2)
12650, 18354
10747, 12304,
15744,© 15759,
20567
10586, 11539 ,<£
15396,(3) 16482,
10965, 12247:
11697,
15878,
16130
12897, 13151,
15928, 16145,
14514, 15306, 16707,©
18723, 18749, 18906,
13882, 14772,© 14773,©
16052, 16352,© 16353, @
11540,® 11744, 12816,
17846, 18741, 20389
17614, 17642, 20872
12318, 13103, 13974, 18292
16477, 20313
FUEL PROBLEM ( 2)
15730, 20587
O~ same occurrence
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APPENDIX C
ALERT BULLETINS ISSUED SINGLE PILOT
IFR OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS
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APPENDIX C
ALERT BULLETINS ISSUED
SINGLE PILOT IFR OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS
Alert Bulletins represent the ASRS program's principal means
of informing the Federal Aviation Administration and the aviation
community of possible current problems identified through the re-
porting process. Alert Bulletins are prepared when it is believed,
on the basis of one or more reports, that one or more of the fol-
lowing conditions exists:
1. A physical hazard that poses a threat to aircraft operating
within the bounds of accepted operating practices in a given location,
2. An operation, regulatory, or procedural hazard that poses a
threat to aircraft operating within the bounds of accepted operating
practices,
3. A regulation, procedure, or other document is unclear,
ambiguous, or misleading,
4. An accepted operating practice, applied in one or more
locations, contravenes generally accepted or understood rules or
regulations,
5. Some device necessary to safe operation displays a persist-
ent pattern of malfunction which poses a threat to aircraft oper-
ating with the system.
The following five Alert Bulletins have been issued on occur-
rences contained in the SPIFR Document Set, all of which appear in
the Inadequate Service Operational Problem Category:
TEXT: AB 780030, Occurrence 090
A pilot reports that at Beverly, MA Airport (BVY) the
inbound course of the SDF approach for Runway 16 has a
bend which results in runway offset at a critical point
in the approach. Corrective action is requested; bend
is ncriouc enough to have caused missed approaches.
KEYWORDS: NAVAID
RESPONGE TEXT: AB 780030
The Beverly, MA Airport (BVY) SDF was inspected on August
I-"1', 1970 because of the user complaint cited in ASRS
AB 780038. The bend mentioned was found by the flight
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inspection crew on aircraft N-84, however, it was within
the tolerances specified in the United States Standard
Flight Inspection Manual. It may be significant to note
that the BVY SDF is offset which, if the pilot was not
aware of the offset, might tend to make the bend seem
exaggerated.
TEXT: AB 790018, Occurrence 026
Denver, CO., Denver Air Route Traffic Control Center:
A pilot report notes consistent difficulty in maintaining
air/ground radio communication with Denver Center, the
controlling facility, at flight altitudes near MEA in
the mountainous area between Fairfield (FFU), Carbon (PUG),
and Moab (QAB), and during approaches to airports within
that area. Attempts to relay through other facilities
are deemed impractical; reporter suggests installation of
a remote communication (RCAG) facility in the affected
sector of Denver Center.
KEYWORDS: ATC, COMMO
RESPONSE TEXT: AB 790018
Fringe area coverage difficulties will be experienced at
the lower altitudes in the area described due to high
terrain. Construction of a new RCAG site for the Salt
Lake ARTCC (Sunnyside, .Utah) will start this summer.
Commissioning is anticipated in late CY-79 or early CY-80.
A follow-on program is planned to provide an additional
channel, from Sunnyside, to the Denver Center sometime in
late CY-80. Engineering studies indicate the Sunnyside
site should resolve the problems outlined above.
TEXT: AB 790032, Occurrence 103
Jacksonville, NC, RAH Non-Directional Radio Beacon: A
pilot reports that HAH Non-Directional Radio Beacon,
intended to define a segment of Atlantic Route 7, trans-
mits on a frequency of 198 KHZ, which is below the 200
KHZ lower limit assigned for aeronautical frequencies,
and that certain new types of radio direction finding
equipment with digital control markings commencing at
200 KHZ thus cannot receive the beacon. Reporter states
that inability to utilize RAH forces pilot reliance on
radar vectors for navigation.
KEYWORDS: NAVAID, ATC
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RESPONSE TEXT: AB 790032
The high-power for this Radio Beacon was required for
overwater flight between New York and Miami. No fre-
quency in the 200-415 KHZ band was available. Numerous
lower power facilities would have had to give way
(changed or eliminated) to make room for this high-pow-
ered station. Since November 22, 1977, the lower limit
for aeronautical radio beacons has been 190 KHZ. The
present assignment may be an inconvenience to some users
but is not considered unsafe, or contributing to an un-
safe condition.
TEXT: AB 790045, Occurrence 040
Connellsville, PA, Connellsville Airport: Reporting air-
craft flight crew member describes apparent faulty oper-
ation of the Connellsville Non-Directional Beacon; during
a recent flight usable ADF signals were not received until
the aircraft was 12 miles from the airport, at which time
a strong signal was received but provided highly erroneous
bearing information. Reporter states that evidence of
corrosion exists at the beacon antenna site, that main-
tenance is performed infrequently, and that the situation
described is frequently encountered during periods of
precipitation weather. He also reports that other pilots
have reported this condition, which can be hazardous to
flight in view of the mountainous terrain in the Connel-
lsville area.
KEYWORDS: NAVAID-NDB
RESPONSE TEXT: AB 790045
The subject facility was thoroughly evaluated by an AEA-400
FAA Inspector and flight tested by an FAA flight inspection
aircraft June 19 and May 2 respectively. The results of
the evaluation did not reveal any facility deficiencies to
support the allegation contained in the Alert Bulletin.
A copy of their report is enclosed. We will continue to
closely monitor the facility performance.
TEXT: AB 800003, Occurrence 056
Seattle, WA, Seattle Air Route Traffic Control Center:
Reporting pilot describes recent IFR flights during which
he has received vectors from Seattle Center directing him
away from his flight-planned route and toward terrain
higher than his flight altitude. Reporter expresses appre-
hension that in the absence of a vector clearance limit by
ATC or instructions to return to flight-planned route,
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pilots may be forced to invoke lost-communication pro-
cedures to avoid hazardous compromise of terrain-
clearance requirements. He feels that standard procedures
should be publicized and utilized to avert placing pilots
on vectors toward high terrain with no limiting course of
action indicated as a part of clearances.
KEYWORDS: ATC PROCEDURES
RESPONSE TEXT: AB 800003
Handbook 7110.65A, paragraphs 680 and 681/ state the con-
troller's responsibility for the application and methods
of radar vectoring. If the pilot thinks an unsafe as-
signed heading or altitude has been issued he should
question it per the Airman's Information Manual (AIM)
paragraph 405. Based on the information provided by the
reporter, we are unable to determine if these procedures
were adhered to. However, we are presently reviewing
existing procedures to ascertain if procedural changes can
be made, without creating additional safety concerns, to
provide the pilot more opportunity for advance planning,
and assist in determining when to implement action required
by FAR 91.127.
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